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Translation as Interpretat ion 
Albert Péter Vermes 
While we obviously have an intuitive knowledge of what makes a translation a 
translation, if we want to be able to provide a systematic and explicit 
characterisation of the nature of the translation process, it will have to be done, 
as is claimed, for instance, by Steiner (1975/1992) and Gutt (1991), in terms of a 
suitable theory of communication. This paper argues in favour of this approach 
and shows how translation can be explicated within the bounds of relevance 
theory, along the lines presented in Gutt (1991). 
1 Translation as Interpretation: A First Approximation 
Today it is commonly accepted that translation is more than just mere 
manipulation of language or linguistic utterances—it is a form of inter-
lingual or, in a wider sense, intercultural communication. The essential 
question here is how translation is different from other forms of com-
munication. 
One specific characteristic of communication through translation is, 
of course, that it involves, apart from the original or source communi-
cator, an extra communicator, the translator, who mediates between the 
source communicator and the target of the translation process, the target 
audience. In this respect, translating seems similar to the situation where 
in a noisy place somebody has to render the words of the person stand-
ing on his right side to the one standing on the left because under the 
circumstances they cannot communicate with each other directly, even 
though they may share a common language. What makes the rendering 
of the message necessary here is that there is noise in the channel of 
communication, which blocks the transfer of information between the 
communicator and the audience. 
There are then other situations in which the signal gets through to 
the audience, who is, moreover, familiar with the code, yet it does not 
seem to make sense to him. This might happen, for instance, in the case 
of sophisticated texts on elaborate topics (such as linguistics or commu-
nication), where the reader, although familiar with the language, will be 
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puzzled at what the language conveys and will ask for the help of some-
body who can explain or interpret the text for him. 
Translation, however, is different f rom the above cases in that the 
interference of a mediator is necessitated not simply because the signal 
needs to be amplified or because the audience is unable to make sense of 
it but, first of all, because the signal as such is unintelligible to the audi-
ence. 
Thus, translation may be seen as a form of communication where 
the translator, a mediator, interprets the source communicator's message 
for the target audience, as he is incapable of interpreting it for himself. 
This can happen for two main reasons. Firstly because the audience may 
not be able to identify the source signals (problems with the code) and, 
secondly, because the audience may not possess the necessary back-
ground information for making sense of them (problems with the con-
text). 
Unfortunately, this definition of translation as an interpretive com-
municative process is sdll too wide and imprecise in that it allows for the 
inclusion within its bounds of phenomena which are not normally 
thought of as instances of translation, such as hermeneutic interpretation 
or reading a fairytale to a child. However, it puts into focus the notion of 
interpretation, which may serve as the starting point of the quest for a 
more rigorous definition of translation. 
2 Interpretation 
As explained in Sperber and Wilson (1986), utterance interpretation is an 
inferential process whereby the audience, on the basis of the context, 
infers from the stimulus the intended meaning of the communicator. For 
this to happen, the audience must use the set of contextual assumptions 
envisaged by the communicator, otherwise the communication may fail. 
Let us call the situation when this condition is fulfilled a primary communi-
cation situation, and the second, where the audience uses a more or less 
different set of contextual assumptions a secondary communication situation 
(Gutt 1991:73). 
Translation, of course, often occurs in secondary communication 
situations. An important question here is whether a given message (set of 
assumptions intended by the communicator) can be communicated in 
such a situation and to what extent. A secondary communication situa-
tion will often result in a misinterpretation. An observation to this effect 
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appears in Seleskovieh (1977), where she notes that problems in the 
process of interpretation arise when the translator lacks the necessary 
knowledge of the world and /o r of the cognitive context (of the text) which 
can enable her to work out the non-verbal sense of the text on the basis of 
its linguistic meaning. Gutt (1991) lists four kinds of misinterpretations 
which may arise when a linguistic utterance is interpreted against a con-
text different from the one that was actually intended by the communi-
cator: 
• The use of wrong contextual assumptions can lead to the 
choice of the wrong semantic representation; 
• A wrong context may lead to the derivation of a wrong 
propositional form; 
• Wrong contextual assumptions can prevent the identification 
of a propositional form as an intended explicature or as only 
a source of implicatures; 
• A wrong context can also lead to the derivation of implica-
tures not intended or, vice versa, to the loss of implicatures 
actually intended by the communicator (p. 73). 
The terms explicature and implicature are meant in the following 
sense. When an assumption communicated by the utterance is a devel-
opment of a logical form encoded by the utterance, we call this assump-
tion an explicature. This is the case with ordinary assertions, where the 
propositional form of the utterance is part of the intended interpretation. 
The situation is different, of course, with figurative or non-assertive ut-
terances: here the propositional form of the utterance is not an explica-
ture because it is not part of the intended interpretation. When an as-
sumption is communicated otherwise, it is called an implicature (Sperber 
and Wilson 1986:182). 
According to relevance theory an act of communication can only be 
successful if it achieves relevance in a given set of contextual assump-
tions, and relevance is defined in terms of contextual effects and processing 
effort. There are three ways in which the contextualisation of new as-
sumptions in a context of old assumptions may achieve some contextual 
effect: by adding new assumptions to the context in the form of con-
textual implications, by strengthening some old assumptions or by eras-
ing others. Otherwise, if a contextualisation does not modify the context 
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(because the new assumptions are found too weak and are consequently 
erased) or all it does is simply add some new assumptions to it, it will 
have failed to achieve any contextual effect (Sperber and Wilson 
1986:117). 
Relevance, then, is clearly context-dependent: a given set of assump-
tions to be communicated that yields an appropriate number of contex-
tual effects may fail to do so in a different context and thus the commu-
nication may break down. Alternatively, it can break down because the 
effort needed to work out these contextual effects in a secondary context 
may be gratuitously great, leading to a loss of interest in the communica-
tion on the part of the audience. As Bell (1991) writes, this is the point, 
the threshold of termination, "where the reader has got enough out of the 
text and /o r feels that, in cost-benefit terms, there is little point in con-
tinuing" (p. 213). 
It is then a gross oversimplification of matters to say that a given 
message can always be communicated through translation: it is only 
possible if the secondary context makes it possible to communicate that 
message. And this is exactly what Steiner says when he writes "not 
everything can be translated now " (Steiner 1975/1992:262, italics as in 
original). Some things may defy translation at a given moment but 
through changes of context and language may become translatable in the 
future. 
Translators, too, have long been (even if only intuitively) aware of 
this fact. This is manifest in translations which are addressed to an 
audience essentially different from the original one, for instance when a 
great classic of American literature like The Last of the Mohicans by James 
Fennimore Cooper was rendered into Hungarian by Ádám Réz in such a 
way that long politico-historical descriptive passages were eliminated for 
the obvious reason that the translation was done for children, who 
would not be interested in these or, rather, would not be prepared to 
interpret such descriptions, all of which might result in the child reader 
losing interest and putting the book down. Thus in such a case it may be 
a wise decision on the part of the translator to leave out these parts, in 
order to ensure that the communication as a whole would be successful. 
In sum, the primary question in translation is not in what way a 
given message can be communicated in the target language but whether 
it is communicable at all in the context of the receiving culture, in the 
given communicative situation, in consistency with the principle of 
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relevance; all other considerations follow from the answer given to this 
fundamental question. Thus, as Gutt writes, the translator, first of all, 
needs to clarify for herself whether the original informative intention is 
communicable in the given circumstances or it needs to be modified, and 
only then can she start thinking about the question of exactly how her 
communicative intention may be formulated (Gutt 1991:180). 
3 Translation as Interlingual Interpretive Use 
If, as is most often the case, the same informative intention cannot be 
conveyed in the secondary context, then it will need to be altered in or-
der to make it communicable, while ensuring at the same time that only 
such changes are effected as absolutely necessary to achieve this purpose. 
Translation can then be seen as the act of communicating in the secon-
dary context an informative intention that interpretively resembles the 
original one as closely as possible under the given conditions. This entails 
that the principle of relevance in translation is manifested as a presumption 
of optimal resemblance: the translation is "(a) presumed to interpretively re-
semble the original [...] and (b) the resemblance it shows is to be con-
sistent with the presumption of optimal relevance" (Gutt 1991:101). In 
other words: the translation should resemble the original in such a way 
that it provides adequate contextual effects and it should be formulated 
in such a manner that the intended interpretation can be recovered by 
the audience without undue processing effort. 
The following example in (1), taken from Péter Esterházy's Hrabal 
könyve (Magvető Kiadó, Budapest, 1990, p. 10) and its English translation 
in (2) by Judith Sollosy (Quartet Books, London, 1993, p. 4) will help to 
elucidate what optimal resemblance means in translation (the italics are 
mine). 
(1) Volt cukrászda, két konkurens kocsma, melyet mindenki a régi 
nevén hívott, a Serhá^ meg a Kondász ... 
(2) There was a café of sorts and two rival taverns, which 
everyone called by their old names, the Beerhall and the 
Kondász .. . 
The problem here is that the Hungarian word 'ser' is associated with 
an encyclopaedic assumption to the effect that the expression is old-
fashioned, it is not used any longer, and evokes the atmosphere of "the 
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golden days" of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Since in this part of 
the book the writer describes the layering upon each other of the past 
and present, this assumption definitely has some contextual importance 
here. However, the English word 'beer' does not carry a comparable as-
sumption and this part of the context is thus lost in the translation. O n 
the other hand, it has a near synonym in English, 'ale', which does con-
tain in its encyclopaedic entry the assumption, waking images of the past, 
that this drink is brewed in the traditional way, without adding hops. 
Moreover, the related compound 'alehouse' is further loaded with the 
encyclopaedic assumption that the expression is outdated, old-fashioned, 
and its use in the translation would thus have resulted in the closest pos-
sible interpretive resemblance with the original. Here, in my opinion, the 
translator committed a mistake: she let part of the context be lost with-
out a good reason, since the preservation of the encyclopaedic assump-
tion in question would not have caused a considerable increase of 
processing effort and would not therefore have threatened the optimal 
relevance of the translation. In this case, then, although the target text 
does fulfil the presumption of optimal relevance, the level of interpretive 
resemblance could have been made higher. In traditional terms, this 
might be called an instance of "unjustified translation loss", which in this 
case means the loss of some implicature, while in other cases an expli-
cature can also be lost in similarly unwarranted ways. On the other hand, 
it may happen that the preservation of some implicature or explicature 
will threaten the optimal relevance of the target text; that is, an excessive 
degree of interpretive resemblance may also count as a—different kind 
of—translation mistake. 
We have arrived at, then, a definition of translation which seems to 
provide all the necessary conditions to guide the translator: 
They determine in wha t respects the translation should 
resemble the original—only in those respects that can be 
expected to make it adequately relevant to the receptor 
language audience. T h e y determine also that the translation 
should be clear and natural in expression in the sense that it 
should no t be unnecessarily difficult to understand (Gut t 
1991:102). 
These conditions, among other things, seem to explain why it is 
preferred that the translator translate into her mother tongue (or her 
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"language of habitual use", as is sometimes allowed). The translator, on 
the one hand, has to be able to predict what assumptions might be 
present in the audience's cognitive environment and this is most likely 
when they share a common culture. And, on the other hand, she has to 
possess an ease of expression in the target language which is normally 
possible only in the mother tongue. That is, in most cases the translator 
will be familiar with the cultural context and also with the language to an 
extent sufficient to enable her to satisfy the above conditions only in her 
mother tongue and very rarely in a foreign language. 
The above definidon also accounts for another interesting problem, 
namely that although the degree of resemblance between translation and 
original can always be increased, for some reason it often seems undesir-
able. We can now explain why this is so: exactly because the increase in 
resemblance may be accompanied by an increase of processing effort 
which might outweigh the gains in contextual effects. The two factors, 
contextual effects and processing effort need to be carefully balanced by 
the translator, who has to accept the fact that losses in contextual effects 
are sometimes unavoidable in order to keep the processing effort at a 
reasonable level, thereby ensuring the overall success of the communica-
tion. Relevance, it needs to be kept in mind, is always a joint function of 
contextual effects and processing effort. 
Having accepted a definition of translation as an act of communica-
tion aimed at optimal resemblance with the original, it seems in order 
that I clarify certain points here. First of all, how should we understand 
the expression "the translation optimally resembles the original"? The terms 
"translation" and "original" are certainly not meant here as the translated 
and the original text (a text, in the narrow sense, is a collection of printed 
marks) but as the set of assumptions they give rise to in the secondary 
and the primary contexts, respectively. 
Second, what is the specificity of translation (as a form of 
interpretive language use) compared to monolingual communication? In 
monolingual communication the communicator communicates (that is, 
provides evidence, for the audience, for) her own thoughts, whereas a 
translator communicates (provides evidence for) the assumptions con-
veyed by the source text, which she has worked out in a different context 
and language, built on a conceptual system which is likely to be, at least 
partially, different from that of the secondary context (including the tar-
get language). Thus the uniqueness and the difficulty of translation lies 
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partly in the fact that it involves second-order interpretation and pardy in 
that it may (and most of ten does) necessitate a shift between conceptual 
systems. 
Third, does this definition enable us to distinguish translation f rom 
other forms of interlingual communication, like adaptation, where a 
certain interpretive relationship between two texts also obtains? In Gutt 's 
(1991) view, every interlingual interpretive act of communication is an 
act of translation, irrespective of how close is the interpretive 
relationship between the source and the target text. This relationship 
may range from com'plete to non-existent, and since in this continuum 
there are no natural break-points, the theory does not provide a grasp to 
distinguish between what counts as translation and what counts as non-
translation. Yet, at one point he does allow for the possibility of 
separating translation f rom, for instance, paraphrase in such a way that 
an interpretive act which does not fulfil the promise of optimal relevance 
may be regarded as paraphrase (Gutt 1991:121). In my opinion, however, 
this view takes us the wrong way for the following reasons. The 
relevance of a stimulus is always a function of the context and thus an 
utterance which is optimally relevant in one context, may not be so in a 
different context. From this it follows that an interpretive act which is 
optimally relevant in one context and is thus a translation, may not be 
optimally relevant in another context and would therefore be an instance 
of non-translation. I do not think that this would be a desirable turn. 
Whether a given target text qualifies as translation or not, obviously, 
cannot depend on if it is optimally relevant but on the intention with 
which it was produced. The pivotal question, in my view, is whether the 
secondary communicator intended the target text to be a translation or a 
paraphrase. This, of course, is a rather trivial statement. The question is 
how and, most importantiy, whether the theory is able to grasp this 
difference of intentions. I think it is, and the crucial element is contained 
in the definition. If translation is regarded as a communicative act which, 
in the secondary context, purports to convey an informative intention 
that interpretively resembles the original as closely as possible, this means 
that an interpretive act of communication will be a translation only i f i t is 
produced with the intention to convey in the secondary context, in 
consistence with the principle of optimal relevance, those and only those 
explicatures and implicatures which the original conveyed in the primary 
context. If the secondary communicator does not have this basic 
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intention then the target text is not a translation but something else, a 
summary or an exegesis, for example. 
4 Direct and Indirect Translation 
A limiting case of translation as interpretive use is when the interpretive 
resemblance between the translation and the original is purportedly 
complete: that is, when the translation "purports to allow the recovery of 
the originally intended interpretation interlingually" (Gutt 1991:163). In a 
way, this is similar to direct quotations, which may be employed to allow 
the recovery of the original interpretation intralingually, on condition 
that they are processed in the original context. Generally speaking, two 
stimuli may give rise to the same interpretation if and only if they are 
processed in the same context, because any interpretation is causally de-
pendent on the interplay between stimulus and context. 
This kind of direct translation, consequently, is only possible if the 
translation is processed in the original, or primary, context, otherwise the 
contextual differences will result in differences in contextual effects. 
Technically, the following definition can be adopted: 
A receptor language ut terance is a direct translation of a 
source language ut terance if and only if it pu rpor t s to 
interpretively resemble the original completely in the context 
envisaged for the original (Gutt 1991:163). 
Naturally, in interlingual (intercultural) situations it is very rare that 
the original context should be available in the target culture. It is possible 
perhaps in circumstances where different language communities have 
shared the same geographical, political, and economic environment for a 
long enough time to eliminate major cultural differences but in most 
cases the secondary communication situation will be substantially differ-
ent to exclude the possibility of direct translation. This, then, implies that 
the default case is not direct but indirect translation, which covers various 
grades of interpretive resemblance. 
Consider, for an illustration of the exposition above, example 3, 
taken from an interview with Clint Eastwood by Ginny Dougarry (The 
Times Magazine, 28 xMarch 1998, p. 19): 
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(3) In the early Fifties, during his two-year stint in the US Army, 
he had a casual relationship with a schoolteacher in Carmel. 
When he attempted to end the affair, she turned violent. Did it 
frighten him? "Yeah, it gave me the spooks," he says. "It 
wasn't a homicide—someone trying to kill me. But it was 
someone stalking me and threatening to kill themself." 
What is interesting here is the use of the pronominal form 
'themself ' , when the referent is clearly a female person. Naturally, any-
one familiar with the present-day American cultural context will realise 
that this is probably the result of a somewhat exaggerated effort to com-
ply with expectations of political correctness. Thus (3) conveys the fol-
lowing implicature: 
(4) Clint is trying to be PC. 
N o w what could a Hungarian translator do with the last sentence in 
(3)? Let us first suppose she assumes that her average Hungarian reader 
knows nothing about what PC means in America and she does not con-
sider it possible to introduce this notion within the limits of the given 
translation task. In this case, assumption (4) will, most probably, be 
completely lost, and the result will be an instance of indirect translation, 
since the interpretive resemblance between the original and the transla-
tion is less than complete. 
Let us now suppose that the translator assumes her reader to be 
familiar with the concept of PC, that is, she assumes that the translation 
operates in the same context as the original does. Then she could try to 
look for a solution that will convey assumption (4) in the Hungarian text, 
thereby achieving complete interpretive resemblance, in this respect at 
least, between (3) and the translation, which can thus be said to be an 
instance of direct translation. 
Parenthetically, my guess is that in this particular case the assump-
tion is likely to be lost because the difference concerning pronominal 
gender contrast between the two languages would probably make the 
preservation of the assumption too effort-consuming and would thus 
threaten the optimal relevance of the translation. 
Therefore, it seems that here the translation is doomed to be 
somewhat indirect but, regarding that (4) is a relatively weak implicature, 
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no serious damage occurs—unless, of course, (4) will later be needed as 
part of the context. 
5 Conditions and Corollaries of Direct Translation 
The notion of direct translation, however, sheds light on some important 
points. First of all, complete interpretive resemblance can only be aimed 
at if the translator herself is capable of performing a thorough interpre-
tation of the original. If this condition is not fulfilled, then the translation 
cannot even purport to be direct, in the true sense of the term. What this 
entails is the requirement for the translator to be thoroughly familiar 
with not only the two languages but also with the two cultures (cultural 
contexts) in question. 
Second, direct translation may serve as a useful means of 
familiarising the target audience with the source culture by communicat-
ing to him the original informative intention. On the other hand, the 
originally intended interpretation, as we have seen, is only communicable 
in the original context, which entails that the target audience needs to 
have, or seek, access to all of this contextual background information. 
This means that the translator has to look for ways to provide such in-
formation and it also points to the fact that direct translation in many 
cases requires some extra effort on the part of the audience as well, in 
the hope of gaining a full understanding of the original message. One 
might see some contradiction in that direct translation presupposes the 
availability of the original context and that, at the same time, the target 
reader may be expected to make an effort in accessing this context. I do 
not, however, see this as a problem. Direct translation presupposes the 
original context in the sense that complete interpretive resemblance can-
not be achieved in a different context and thus the translator, aiming at 
direct translation, is bound to suppose that the target text will be proc-
essed by the reader in the original context. It is a different question 
whether the target reader is in fact able to access this context (that is, 
whether it is part of his cognitive environment) and if not, whether he is 
willing to exert some effort to that effect. For this to happen, the reader 
needs to be aware of the necessity of this effort, that is, he needs to 
know that what he is reading is a translation, and a translation which was 
produced with the aim of reproducing the original informative intention 
(message) in full. 
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Then, thirdly, as Gut t (1991) also points out, in such circumstances 
it is a crucial requirement, in order that the communication does not fail, 
that the audience be explicidy made aware by the translator of the 
intended degree of resemblance between the original and the transladon 
in a translator's foreword or otherwise (p. 183). This case, when the 
target reader is aware of the fact that what he is reading is a translation, 
Gutt (1991) calls overt translation. 
Finally, the translator, as any communicator, has to make sure that 
her communicative intentions are in accordance with the expectations of 
the audience. If she thinks that the intended target audience will not be 
able or willing to exert the extra effort demanded by a direct translation 
then she will be bound to choose another approach to the given 
translation task, in order to ensure the success of the communication 
(Gutt 1991:185). 
6 Conclusions 
The notion of translation as interpretive language use is based on the 
view that translation is a form of communication and, as such, can be 
accounted for in terms of the relevance theory of communication. This 
implies that the theory of translation is a natural part of the theory of 
communication and that any translation principle, rule or guideline is an 
application of the principle of relevance and "all the aspects of transla-
tion [...], including matters of evaluation, are explicable in terms of the 
interaction of context, stimulus and interpretation" through this principle 
(Gutt 1991:188). 
Of course, the importance of the context had already been realised 
by the communicative-functional approaches to translation as well. Poly-
system theory, skopos theory, and the action theory of translation all 
pointed out that a translation is always the product of a specific context, 
including various factors such as cultural conventions, the circumstances 
and expectations of the target reader, or the intended purpose of the 
translation and thus the content of the translation is effectively deter-
mined by these factors. As a consequence, in these theories the source 
text is relegated, from the status of the absolute measure of evaluation, 
to that of a mere stimulus or source material and the success of the 
translation is measured by its functional adequacy in the target context. 
In this, these approaches can be regarded as the forerunners of relevance 
theory. What I see as a major advantage of relevance theory is that, con-
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trary to them, it actually explicates what adequacy means in a context: a 
text can be regarded adequate in a context inasmuch as it achieves opti-
mal resemblance in it. In this framework, we could even substantiate the 
much-debated notion of equivalence, by considering it as the instance of 
maximal interpretive resemblance of the translation to the original in the 
secondary communicative context of the translation. This brief and 
sketchy train of thought was only meant to illustrate that the conceptual 
apparatus of relevance theory can also be used in the analysis of matters 
of translation quality with the sort of explicitness which, I think, is not 
offered by any of the previous theories. 
As for the objection to the application of relevance theory to trans-
lation, voiced among others by Tirkkonen-Condit (1992), concerning the 
vagueness of the criteria by which the translator can decide what is rele-
vant in a context, the answer is that, on the one hand, no other theory 
has ever come close to providing nearly as explicit a definition of what 
relevance means in communication and, on the other hand, eventually 
the success of an act of translation, as of all communication, is the re-
sponsibility of the translator-communicator—it depends on how well 
she assesses the cognitive environment of the assumed target reader. 
Another critical observation concerning Gutt's theory is that he does 
not try to link his statements to the notions and categories of earlier, 
more traditional, theories of translation. Although he does recognise, for 
instance, the correspondence of the distinction between his direct arid 
indirect translation with the distinction between the traditional categories 
of literal and free translation, he abstains from using these, in my view, in 
order not to burden his notions with unnecessary connotations. This, I 
believe, is not a shortcoming but the natural result of his intention to 
break away from the descriptive-classificatory approach. Gutt 's theory is 
not a translation theory in the traditional sense but, rather, the applica-
tion of a general communication theory to translation. As such, it is not 
in the strict sense part of what we may call the traditional literature on 
translation since, instead of using concepts worked out specifically for 
describing translation, it attempts to refine an already existing conceptual 
apparatus in order to make it more general in scope, enabling it to handle 
an even wider range of communication phenomena. 
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